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We also need the optimal number of users * = * ( * , * ) and number of third parties * = * ( * , * ) to be positive. So we need to have 
Proposition 2
Using the formula for optimal number of third parties in (13), we have * = − < 0 (A3.1) * = − (i) Profit of each publisher website is calculated by substituting the optimal royalties and price equations (10) and (11) from Lemma 1 into the publisher website profit equation, and is given in equation (14) in Proposition 3. We have * = ( ) (A4.1) which is positive when < and is negative when < . ∎
(ii) We calculate the user surplus from each publisher website as follows: (17) and (18), the optimal profit for the website is calculated as * =
Taking the derivative of profit with respect to the taxations we have * =
which is positive when < √ , and is negative when
< 0 (A6.3)
(ii) User surplus when taxations are possible is calculated as * = 
which is positive when < √ and is negative when √ < .
(iii) Third party surplus when taxations are present is calculated as
and we have * = −
> 0 (A6.9)
∎

Appendix B Extension of Proposition 3
In Proposition 3 in the paper, we analyzed the effect of privacy concerns on publisher website profit, third party surplus, and user surplus. Here, we expand the analysis to consider other model parameters. Propositions B.1, B.2, and B.3 provide these results. We do not provide the proofs for these propositions as they are straightforward and can be calculated by taking the derivatives for equations (14), (15), and (16) for optimal website profit, user surplus, and third party surplus, respectively. 
Appendix C Asymmetric Model
In the asymmetric model, the two firms are asymmetric in terms of user privacy concerns. The user utility for websites in this case is as follows:
The user who is indifferent between websites 1 and 2 is calculated as
and the number of users for each publisher website is calculated as
The third party profit and website profit equations as well as the equation for number of third parties in this case are similar to the base model. The number of users and third parties with respect to the parameters are calculated as
Using these equations along with the website profit function, the optimal royalties and prices of the websites can be calculated as follows:
Note that the website prices are calculated based on the price from the other website, and the equilibrium price in analytically intractable when can differ from . It is clear from (C8) that the publisher website i's price is nonlinear in v i and v -i . The results from the numerical
analysis are provided in the body of the paper.
Appendix D Effect of Privacy Concerns on Market Concentration
In studying the third party market concentration, we consider two cases: third parties with homogenous shares of the market and third parties with nonhomogenous shares of the market. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a recognized measure for market concentration. The HHI is generically calculated as follows:
where s j is the market share of j th third party.
Third Parties with Homogenous Market Shares
In the symmetric duopoly model, because the publisher websites set identical royalties and prices, the third parties either participate in both publisher websites, or do not participate at all. In the homogeneous market share case, the total number of third parties on a particular publisher website i is . When all of the third parties have an equal share of the market, the market share of each third party j is
The HHI is then calculated as
By inserting the optimal number of third parties from Proposition 2, we have
It can be seen that HHI is increasing in v. In other words, the market concentration is increasing in the user privacy concerns.
To include the effect of barriers to entry, we rewrite the total number of potential third parties, M D to be as M D /B, where B is the level of barrier. This means that higher barriers will reduce the number of potential third parties. We can rewrite the HHI formula as
It can be seen that HHI is increasing in the entry barrier level, so the market concentration is increasing in the level of barrier to entry. The level of barrier to entry is higher for third parties that operate in areas with high privacy concerns and high information sensitivity. In practice, privacy is one reason that third parties need to invest more in information technology (IT) security. These IT investments lead to higher sunk cost of entry, and are a major barrier to entry.
Third Parties with Nonhomogeneous Market Shares
While previously we assumed the market shares to be homogenous for all third parties, this is not realistic in most cases. It results in a market concentration measure that is only dependent on the number of third parties utilized by the publisher websites. We now reconsider the asymmetric model described in the "Asymmetry in User Privacy Concerns" section of the paper, where v 1 varies and v 2 is held constant, using the number of third parties for the two publisher websites to calculate the third party market shares.
Let the number of third parties on publisher websites 1 and 2 be and , respectively. Note that since the third parties are
differentiated only based on their costs, if a third party participates on the publisher website with higher privacy concern (and higher royalty), then it will also participate on the publisher website with lower privacy concerns (and lower royalty). Thus, there are a total of unique third parties active in the market. Out of these third parties, of them participate in both
, publisher websites, and the rest of them participate in only one publisher website (the one with lower privacy concerns).
Let J 1 be the set of third parties who participate in only one publisher website, and J 2 be the set of third parties who participate in both publisher websites, where J 1 _ J 2 = ± / . The size of J 1 is |J 1 | = , the size of J 2 is |J 2 | = ,
and J 1 ^ J 2 is the set of all third parties which has a size of |J 1 ^ J 2 | = . Third parties that are present on both publisher
websites have a market size that is twice as much as those that participate in only one publisher website. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the following market sizes for each third party. The market size of each third party j (q j ) depends on how many publisher websites they serve.
Let S be the total market size, which is calculated as the sum of relative market share for all third parties. We have
The market share of each third party (s j ) is calculated as the ratio of their market size to the total market size, that is
Now that the total market size and share of each third party is known, we calculate the HHI as follows: Without loss of generality, let's assume that . It can be shown that HHI will be maximized when . publisher websites are different from each other. Next we will see how this factor directs the way market concentration is affected by user privacy concerns.
As we saw in Figure 5d Figure D2 provides the effect of user privacy concerns of one publisher website on HHI when the user privacy concerns of the other publisher website is fixed. = lines represent asymmetric cases where v 2 is fixed while v 1 varies. By comparing the homogeneous case to any nonhomogeneous case, it can be seen that the HHI is initially higher for the symmetric case (or equal to in when v 2 = 1). As v 1 increases while less than v 2 , then market concentration for the asymmetric cases can become higher than the symmetric HHI. At v 1 = v 2 , the two lines cross, for v 1 > v 2 , again the HHI for the symmetric case is higher than the asymmetric case.
Appendix E Collusion
The calculations for collusion are provided for the case where one publisher sets the equilibrium royalties ( ) 
For the collusion case, in the publisher website profit equation (9), the prices are set to their optimal values, and both publisher's website royalties are set to R W . The profit is calculated as
which is maximized at for which the profit is
It can easily be shown using the formulae above that the phenomena that collusion royalties are lower than equilibrium royalties and collusion profits are higher than equilibrium profits are analytical results and hold irrespective of the parameters. In other words, the following hold:
.
>
This collusion results in setting lower royalties overall, and thus is also beneficial for the third parties, as presented in the third party surplus curve in Figure E1 .
When collusion is possible, the following formula provides the effect of R W on the user surplus when prices are set to their equilibrium values (we do not consider firms colluding on price but rather only royalties), and publisher websites set equal royalties : 
User Surplus with and Without Collusion with Respect to Royalties
Te collusion is thus not beneficial for the users, as they will be exposed to more third parties due to decrease in R W This can be seen for a numerical example in Figure E2 .
Appendix F Duopoly with Nonlinear Utility Function
For the duopoly with nonlinear utility function (NL Duopoly), the transformations (23) and (24) are made in the base model. We then look at the behavior of the model variables with respect to the different variables. Tables F1, F2 , and F3 present the comparison of the behavior of parameters and variables between the base duopoly model versus the duopoly model with nonlinear utility function.
In Table F1 , it can be seen that while the behavior of some of the parameters are different in the duopoly model with nonlinear utility compared to the base model, the main results of the model in terms of user privacy concerns (v) are consistent with the base model. In Table F2 , we can see that the behavior of the number of users and third parties are entirely consistent between the two duopoly models. As described in Table  F3 , the NL Duopoly model mostly picks up the effect of higher range user privacy concerns seen in the duopoly model for the publisher website profit. While we see some discrepancy among the two models, the overall conclusion is that the results for the duopoly and NL duopoly models are consistent. This is especially true for the key results with respect to user privacy concerns (v). 
Appendix G Monopoly Model
The following tables compare the effect of model parameters on the key variables in the model, as well as on the publisher website profit, user and third party surplus. Tables G1, G2 , and G3 present the comparison of the behavior of parameters and variables between the base duopoly model versus the monopoly model.
In Table G1 , it can be seen that the decision variables of royalties and prices behave similarly in the monopoly and duopoly models. Addition of the Hotelling's parameter in the duopoly model enables us to see the effect of competition on the prices. The higher the differentiation between the two publisher websites (higher ), the higher the prices. In other words, competition would decrease the prices for the publisher websites.
In Table G2 , we can see that the behavior of the number of users in the monopoly model is different from the duopoly model, because the key assumption in the duopoly model is that the market is covered. Thus, the number of users in the duopoly model is independent of the parameters. For the number of third parties, we see that the behavior of the monopoly and duopoly models are similar.
In Table G3 , the publisher website profit, user surplus, and third party surplus are presented. The monopoly model picks up the effect of higher range user privacy concerns seen in the duopoly model for the publisher website profit. For user surplus, the monopoly model picks up the effect of the lower range of user privacy concerns seen in the duopoly model. While we see two different effects in the duopoly model, the pattern of results is consistent between the two models. Thus, our overall conclusion is that the results for the duopoly and monopoly models are not inconsistent. This is especially true for the key results with respect to user privacy concerns (v). 
owner companies comprising 442 classified as T/A, 336 classified as F, and 340 classified as P, with some owner companies providing services in multiple categories. The number of connections made and number of cookies used follow a similar pattern to number of third parties, and so we provide the analysis based on number of third parties only. Table H1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics of the data on number of third parties. 
Observations
Noting that information sensitivity and user privacy concerns likely vary among different publisher websites, we expect the sharing behavior to differ for publisher websites with different subjects. Figure H1 provides the sharing behavior for the top 100 publisher websites in each subject category and industry sector. Table  H2 that the number of third parties are significantly different for most of the categories. Especially, in the T/A sector, news and adult categories are statistically different from other categories. Table H3 provides the statistical test results for number of third parties on different sectors of the industry. It can be seen from Table H3 that the number of third parties used in the T/A industry sector is significantly higher than for both F and P.
We also examine the third party market concentration measure, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on the average monthly unique visitors to the publisher's website in the United States for a single year period ending in March 2014 as provided by compete.com. The T/A sector has the lowest HHI concentrations, followed by P, and then by F. In terms of publisher website categories, we see that news and arts have the lowest industry concentration, with adult having the highest industry concentration. The HHI results are provided in Figure H2 . 
